EXTEND NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY REFORM TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMED FORCES

EXTEND NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY REFORM TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMED FORCES*

November 24, 2015

In-depth reform in national defense and the military must be carried out by following the guiding principles of the 18th CPC National Congress and the third, fourth and fifth plenary sessions of the 18th CPC Central Committee, and the theories of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development. Following the requirements of the Four-pronged Comprehensive Strategy and the Party’s goal of building a strong military in the new era, we will carry out our military strategy for the new era and the strategy of strengthening the military through reform. We will break down institutional, structural and policy barriers, and modernize the organization of the armed forces to further unleash and strengthen the combat capability and vigor of the armed forces. By doing so, we will build strong national defense and armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international status and in compliance with our national security and development interests, which will provide a strong guarantee for realizing the Two Centenary Goals and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. 

To understand the above guiding principles, we should follow the Party’s goal of building a strong military, and review, guide and promote defense and military reform with this goal. To realize this goal, since the 18th CPC National Congress the Central Military Commission (CMC) has made overall plans for building revolutionary, modern and standardized armed forces, taken measures to promote the development and deployment of military forces, coordinated economic development and improvement in national defense, formulated military strategies for the new era, put forward a series of major policies and principles, and made a series of major decisions and plans. We must carry out these strategic plans and designs well through reform, so as to provide a powerful driving force and an institutional guarantee for realizing our goal of building a strong military. We should focus on the following: 

First, to reinforce political commitment in the military in the current era, we will exercise both absolute leadership and efficient command of the armed forces. To this end, a new structure will be established in which the CMC exercises overall leadership, the theater commands take responsibility for military operations, and the services focus on developing their capabilities. This structure is the foundation of the reform of military leadership and command systems. It has been set by the CPC Central Committee and the CMC based on the overall situation in the Party, the country, and the military, and on a profound understanding of the requirements for leadership and command of modern armed forces. It embodies the in-depth political considerations of the Central Committee and the CMC. The purpose of establishing this structure is to ensure the Party’s absolute leadership and the CMC’s efficient command over the military, and the CMC’s sound planning and stronger efforts in the development and administration of the armed forces. To drive deeper reform in national defense and the military, we must first and foremost understand the significance of this structure and base our efforts firmly on this foundation. 

I have reiterated many times that reform does not mean changing our orientation or nature. Deeper reform in national defense and the military aims to help our distinctive socialist military institutions achieve self-improvement and development, and thereby better leverage their strengths. In the course of this reform, we need to maintain the correct political orientation, outline a series of institutional designs and arrangements to consolidate and improve the fundamental principle of absolute Party leadership over the armed forces and the systems that support it, and strengthen the CMC’s centralized, unified leadership to ensure that the CPC Central Committee and the CMC exercise supreme leadership and command over the military. This should be held firmly, allowing no ambiguity or wavering, no matter how the reform is to be carried out. 

We have decided to modify the system of general departments of the CMC. Formed over the decades, the system has played an important role in the development of our armed forces and the completion of major tasks. However, with changing circumstances and missions, the problems of this system have become increasingly obvious, the most prominent being functions that are too general, segmented authority, conflicting policies from different departments, mutual interference, and weak strategic planning. The concentration of power in the four general departments of the PLA (Headquarters of the General Staff, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armament Department) is particularly prominent, and these bodies form a de facto independent layer of leadership that exercises many functions of the CMC. This is not in line with the CMC’s centralized, unified leadership. Therefore, we have decided to replace this system with one comprising multiple departments, which include seven departments (general office), three commissions and five directly affiliated bodies. The purpose is to improve the institutional structure of and functional allocation for the CMC bodies and make them truly advising, enforcing, and serving bodies of the CMC.

Our military has long adopted a system combining operations command with capacity building and deployment of the military forces, which took its shape under specific historical conditions. Now it is difficult for this system to effectively respond to the call of a modern and specialized military capable of fighting and winning wars in the information age. Unless it is adjusted, it will inevitably affect combat efficiency and overall development of our armed forces and hinder the CMC’s efficient leadership and command over the entire military. We have decided to regroup the current military area commands into theater commands, establish and improve the administrative system of all services of the armed forces to realize a proper degree of separation of the operations command function and the capacity building and administration functions, i.e., having theater commands assume the primary role in joint operations command and having services of the armed forces undertake the main role in capacity building and administration, so that theater commands and services perform their respective functions and take respective responsibilities under the unified leadership of the CMC. 

In accordance with our understanding of national security threats and the military’s missions and tasks, we have decided to regroup the existing seven military area commands into five theater commands – the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Central theater commands. We have decided to improve the CMC’s joint operations command institution and establish corresponding institutions at the theater level, in order to form a lean and efficient strategic and campaign command system composed of permanent and specialized command establishments which ensures both combat readiness in peacetime and prompt response in wartime. We will also adjust joint training and joint support mechanisms according to the joint operations command system.

We have designed the administrative system along with the joint operations command system and decided to set up a general command center for the army, aiming to overcome a long-standing structural weakness in the organization of our military, create conditions for establishing and improving a joint operations command system, and facilitate the CMC’s efforts to adjust its functions, streamline institutions and downsize staff. Since the Second Artillery Force functions as a de facto military service, we have decided to rename it the Rocket Force. With these adjustments, we will establish a three-tier “CMC – theater command – troops” command system and a “CMC – services – troops” administrative system.

This reform is transformational in that we will dismantle the long-established system of general departments, the military area commands system, and the land-force-dominated military system. It is a restructuring of the organization of our armed forces. The CMC, theater commands and military services must adapt to this new structure. After the reform, the CMC bodies should be mainly responsible for strategic planning and macro-administration and reorient themselves from the operating model of the general departments system as soon as possible; theater commands should mainly focus on command and operations and shift from the operating model of the military area commands system as soon as possible; military services should direct their efforts mainly towards capacity building and administration of troops, transitioning from the operating model under which capacity building and deployment responsibilities are mingled.

Some comrades worry that the theater commands to be established may not be able to effectively command troops as they do not directly lead and administer troops. Here I must make it clear: As the supreme commanding body in its theater or region, a theater command is empowered with command authority by the CMC; this is an important manifestation of the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, and all troops undertaking operational missions in the theater must obey its commands unconditionally. The power and responsibility of theater commands should be specified and guaranteed with regulations and institutions. Theater commands exercise command in both wartime and peacetime. Without war preparations, military drills, scenario-based combat readiness, or practical experience garnered in time of peace, it will be hard to fulfill the function of joint operations command in case of war. 

Second, to run the military in accordance with the law and enforce strict discipline, we need to focus on regulating power within the military, which demands a strict system of checks and oversight over the exercise of power. Running the military in accordance with the law and enforcing strict discipline are basic principles of the Party. A modern military should be one that attaches great importance to the rule of law and discipline. The guidance and safeguards provided by the rule of law are indispensable for our efforts to strengthen our military and build strong armed forces. We must fully implement the CMC’s Decision on Running the Military with Strict Discipline in Accordance with the Law in New Circumstances, build and improve a Chinese system for law-based administration of military affairs, and expedite changes in three aspects of military governance.

Law-based exercise of power within the military is the key to running the military in accordance with the law. We must strengthen checks and oversight over the exercise of power and confine it in an institutional cage. In the past three years, the Central Committee and the CMC made sweeping efforts to improve conduct and combat corruption in the military, and the Four Forms of Official Misconduct and the spread of corruption were curbed. However, there are deep-rooted problems which have yet to be solved completely, and the fight against corruption in some sectors and fields remains a serious and complex challenge. Power must be confined and supervised – absolute power corrupts absolutely. History has proved the truth of this at home and abroad. We must maintain a tough stance on corruption, and with strong will and determination we must resolutely deal with existing cases and curb the emergence of new ones. We must address both symptoms and root causes, leave no room for corruption, and ensure a crushing victory in our fight against corruption. 

Currently, with regard to checks and supervision over power, problems exist in our institutional design and implementation. The main ones are that some systems are not stringently implemented, and that supervision over the exercise of power is inadequate and ineffective – in particular, checks and supervision over the exercise of power by leadership bodies and leading officials exist in name only. “Those who are good at eradicating troubles always search for their root causes, and those who are good at curing diseases always endeavor to eliminate their sources.” We have decided that decision-making, enforcement and supervisory powers should be separated and assigned in the principle of mutual checks and coordination. Priority should be given to granting sufficient independence and authority to the bodies responsible for discipline inspection and enforcement, auditing, and judicial supervision, so as to close the loopholes in systems and mechanisms and eradicate the breeding grounds of corruption with stricter rules and regulations. 

We have decided to establish a new discipline inspection commission directly under the CMC with teams dispatched to CMC bodies and theater commands for disciplinary inspection and supervision. We will ensure the implementation of the commission’s dual leadership system – leadership from the Party committee at the same level and from the commission/team for discipline inspection at the next-higher level. Having placed the PLA Audit Office under the direct leadership of the CMC last year, we have decided to establish the CMC Audit Office and continue reform of the auditing supervision system, and the system of resident audit will be fully carried out. We will set up a new commission for law and order within the CMC, which will help intensify the CMC’s leadership over the armed forces on law and order. This commission will lead and administrate the PLA Military Court and Procuratorate. We will also adjust the military judicial system, and military courts and procuratorates will be set up based on geographical areas to ensure independent and fair exercise of judicial power in accordance with the law. This reform will help form a system in which decision-making, enforcement and supervisory powers coordinate with and check one another. 

Third, we will optimize the size, structure and composition of our troops for higher quality and efficiency, with the aim of building a crack fighting force. What is crucial to a military is not size but efficiency, which is key to a force’s ability to win battles. We need to optimize the military’s scale and structure, bring out its full potential, and make it leaner but more efficient. 

As ours is a large country with long borders and a complicated peripheral security environment, we shoulder heavy tasks in maintaining stability and managing military challenges, and we need to keep a relatively large military. In spite of this, we still need to downsize our armed forces. We have decided to cut troop numbers by 300,000 and reduce them to 2 million. The decision has been taken in accordance with the demands of our national security and military strategies, and the adjustment serves our overall political and diplomatic interests. 

This means downsizing administrative staff and non-combatants in the military. Following the principle of streamlining the military and increasing efficiency, we will exercise strict control over the rank of each unit, the establishment of internal organizations, and staffing of all administrative bodies from those of the CMC to those of theater commands and military services. If the reform leads to larger administrative bodies with more leading positions and staff, it would go against our original intention. This time, in transforming the CMC bodies from the system of general departments to a multiple-department system, we will conduct a substantial downsizing. Next, we will carry out category-based restructuring and streamlining in line with different circumstances. With current reform, the CMC bodies have taken a big stride forward in dealing with cumbersome organization and overstaffing, setting a good example for the entire military. 

In addition to downsizing, we need to improve the structure. We have decided to adjust and improve the weighting and structure of forces among different services towards a strategic transformation. Our military has a relatively large number of officers and a high officer-soldier ratio. In line with the military’s downsizing, the number of officers will also be reduced substantially. This goal can be achieved by transferring more officer positions to positions for non-commissioned officers and civilian staff, and more active service members to non-active posts, trimming staff establishments of administrative bodies at all levels, slashing redundancy, and reducing leadership posts. We will make greater efforts to reduce units with outdated equipment and make room for developing new combat forces. While improving the military’s size and structure, we will also reform its composition to suit new security needs and operations, so that the military will be complete in organization, well-composed, more flexible in composition, and with a broader range of competencies.

These streamlining and adjustment measures are aimed at higher quality and efficiency. On this basis we will roll out an efficiency-centered revolution of military management, establish modern ideas, improve the system, and optimize the process, so that the military comes under more professional, meticulous, and scientific management. We will establish the CMC Training and Administration Department, which will strengthen the centralized planning, organization and guidance of training across the military and improve the management of troops and military academies. We must strengthen the institutions governing the management of funds, material supplies, procurement, and projects, to achieve greater economic benefits for military expenditures. All military bodies, especially high-level ones, should transform their functions, conduct, and ways of work, press forward with their work in accordance with their statutory functions and jurisdictions, increase their work efficiency and organizational effectiveness, eliminate form over substance and bureaucratism, and solve the problems of “five excesses”.

Fourth, we need to reach the commanding heights in future military competition, take full advantage of innovation-driven development, and explore new ways to drive the army’s war fighting capability. Developing defense science and technology is a basic but pioneering project. Currently, major countries attach great importance to cutting-edge scientific and technological innovations that demand heavy investment and involve high risks but are richly rewarding; they vigorously develop disruptive technologies that can grant substantial advantages in military capabilities. If we fall behind in scientific and technological innovation in our defense, we will be overwhelmed in competition. It is unacceptable to always remain a follower; we must be a leader in some fields. We must apply the innovation-driven development philosophy and raise the contribution of innovation to combat capability. China is now at a crucial and challenging stage in its defense technology development. We need to identify the right breakthrough points, plan ahead, increase research in major technologies and new ideas that are forward-looking, pioneering, exploratory and disruptive, and actively seek a competitive edge in military technologies.

New combat forces represent the development trends of military technology and operation models. It is an urgent task to develop new combat forces. We have no time to waste and must actively foster such forces. Otherwise we will miss the opportunity and be left far behind our rivals.

Fifth, we need to better cultivate, manage and use military personnel, and promote institutional reform and policy innovation for their development, so as to bring about a situation where capable people come forth in large numbers and everyone can display their talents. Manpower is key to strengthening the military. As our military preparation and modernization drive move forward and our weaponry and new combat forces develop rapidly, the shortage of capable personnel has become increasingly apparent. I have given this a lot of thought, and laid much emphasis on the training of officials and a new type of high-caliber military personnel. Further defense and military reform must be conducive to the selection and cultivation of talented people and the efficient development and use of human resources, so as to attract and bring together as much talent as possible.

The intricate classification, decentralized management, and arbitrary application of policies and institutions have caused inefficiency in the use of our military, human resources and even serious waste of such resources. In this round of reform, while upholding the Party’s leadership over the management of officials and personnel, we should improve the human resource classification, integrate human resource management functions, and strengthen centralized and unified management of military personnel, so that the military’s human resources can help improve the military’s capability in combat. We have decided to carry out deeper reform in military academies and improve the new system for training military personnel which consists of academic study, field training, and ongoing in-service education. In particular, we will focus on the training of commanders and advisers for joint operations and new types of combat personnel.

The military’s policies and institutions are related to the intermediate interests of officers and soldiers and are an important means for the military to increase its combat effectiveness and stimulate its vigor. We have taken many measures in recent years. Nevertheless, problems are still prominent, and officers and soldiers continue to call for reform. To adapt to the demands of the military’s functions and missions and the country’s policy and institutional innovation, we have decided to take a series of reform measures. 

We will further reform management systems for officers, soldiers, and civilian staff, as well as systems of medical care, insurance, housing, and payments and benefits for service members. We will improve policies and institutions for the human resources and logistics of the military, and establish a system of policies and institutions that reflect the features of military work and help to strengthen the sense of honor and pride in service members. By doing so, we can better enhance morale and ensure stability of the forces. To meet the requirements of reforming the leadership and command systems and reducing the number of troops by 300,000, we will lose no time in reforming relevant policies and institutions, particularly those concerning civilian staff, the hierarchy which is mainly defined by military ranks, and the career officers system.

An ancient Chinese once said, “Education, training, selection and appointment. If any of these is not done properly, it will ruin all the talent in the country.” That is to say, if any of these four links fail, it will be hard to attract and develop capable people. There is a consensus about the establishment of the career officers system. What is essential is to make breakthroughs in adjusting and reforming systems concerning officers’ service, category-based management, and job qualifications, among others. Specialization and a strong focus on battlefield capability are core to the career officers system. We need to properly design the career routes of officers and ensure that competence, performance and other objective factors play a dominant role in the selection and placement of personnel. 

Civilian staff are important human resources for a modern military. The armed forces of developed countries usually see the importance of the use of civilian staff. Since our military has a relatively small civilian staff, we have plenty of room for reform. We have decided to establish a unified civilian personnel system, and expand the rank of civilian staff by filling some active service posts that serve both military and civilian purposes and are not directly involved in military operations with civilian personnel. We will thereby improve the military personnel composition, reduce the military’s costs in human resources, and recruit excellent civilian professionals to work for the military.

Sixth, we should focus on civil-military integration, advance major reform tasks covering both military and civilian services, and coordinate economic development and national defense. Civil-military integration is not only a measure to invigorate the country but also a strategy to strengthen the military. Upgrading civil-military integration to a national strategy is a major outcome of our long efforts to coordinate economic development and defense, and is an important decision based on the overall strategic goals of national security and development. Since it is a national strategy, we must rally the will and strength of the whole nation behind concerted efforts of both military and civilian services.

There is no lack of enthusiasm for civil-military integration. However, the overall benefits of civil-military integration have not been fully realized for a number of reasons: The mechanisms for coordination between the military and local authorities, supply-demand docking, and resource sharing are not optimal; defense enterprises monopolies and exclusive markets have not been broken; and resources are scattered and development projects are redundant in some key areas. 

At the local level, some sectors and regions give insufficient thought to meeting defense needs and are not supportive enough. On the part of the military, some departments and units, large or small, tend to operate on an all-inclusive model. This departmentalist mentality has resulted in a fragmented system in which each provides their own development and support services. 

It is essential to transform the approach to military development and better integrate military development into national economic and social development. Civil-military integration is important for more quickly transforming the growth model and adjusting the economic structure. Local officials should have a clear understanding of this and take concrete actions. 

To remedy these problems and promote civil-military integration, we need to break down relevant institutional barriers. We will work to establish an efficient organization and management system under unified leadership that facilitates coordination between the military and local authorities; a working system in which the state is the dominant force, demand is the driving force, and the market is the operating force; and a complete policy and institutional framework with supporting measures and effective incentives. With these, we will be able to bring about a structure in which the military and non-military sectors develop together efficiently across multiple fields. We have decided to establish the Commission for Integrated Civil-Military Development under the CPC Central Committee and improve the unified leadership system to provide an institutional guarantee for civil-military integration.

Our armed forces are composed of the PLA, the Armed Police Force, and the militia. To strengthen the unified leadership of the Central Committee and the CMC over the armed forces, we have decided to adjust and reform the leadership and administrative systems of the Armed Police Force according to the requirement of making clear the respective functions and administration of the three sections of our armed forces. Relevant State Council departments should coordinate with the military and work out detailed reform plans. We have also introduced reform measures to improve the institutional framework for the militia and reserve forces and the mobilization for national defense. We have decided to establish the National Defense Mobilization Department of the CMC, which is responsible for organizing and guiding national defense mobilization and reserve force development, and leading and managing provincial military commands. Local Party committees and governments at all levels should coordinate with the armed forces to implement these measures.

Placement of demobilized veterans and their management affect the stability of the military and society at large. Highly educated and trained in the military and tested in major tasks, ex-service members are a valuable resource for the Party and the country. There are still problems in the placement and management of veterans and the services provided to them. We need to strengthen national management and improve relevant policies so as to provide better services to veterans. Relevant departments of the military and local authorities should strengthen coordination and carry forward this work.

Commercial services provided by the military is also a big issue concerning the relationships between the military and local authorities and between the military and civilian sectors. The CPC Central Committee and the CMC decided to bring an end to all business activities of the PLA and the Armed Police Force in 1998, but paid services provided by the military in some sectors are still permitted. Surveys have shown that paid services provided to the public have a negative influence on the military. Thus we must make up our mind that the military must stop providing commercial services to the public in any form. This keeps the armed forces clean and preserves their nature and character. Since the military still undertakes social security tasks assigned by the state in some fields, these tasks can be incorporated into the civil-military integration system.

∗ Part of the speech at the Central Military Commission Conference on Reforming the Armed Forces.

(Not to be republished for any commercial or other purposes.)